Let’s recap what happened in Venezuela:

  • Dressing it as a police operation, a few months ago the US started to blow up civilian boats, thereby killing people accused of alleged crimes which would never have involved death penalties in court. In at least one case, they came back after 40 minutes to kill two survivors of the initial strike—there is no doubt that this is murder. It has been alleged that in some cases they got the wrong people, and in fact one only has the word of the US government for any of these people having to do anything with drugs—not much to go on, if you ask me.
  • The US blockaded Venezuelan ports—an act of war—seized non-US boats that were either in Venezuelan or international waters, and announced that they would be keeping the oil these boats were carrying. The US is not a signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—because it disagreed with Part XI, the part dealing with deep seabed mining—but the US recognizes it as customary international law. That convention allows seizing boats sailing under another flag in foreign or international waters if they are suspected of being engaged in piracy, the slave trade, or, weirdly, unauthorized broadcasting.
  • A couple of days ago the US sent 150 aircraft and the Delta Force to snatch the president of another country—killing in the process a few dozen people—to bring him for trial to the US. All of this is clearly another act of war, but the irony of it all is that a few months ago, the US pardoned a Honduran ex-president who had been judged and condemned in the US for basically the same charges as this president now.

Now, all sorts of countries have often ignored international law. But there are certain things that make this case kind of remarkable:

  • Even when doing something that broke international law, countries have sought to cover what they were doing under international law, not under the excuse of enforcing drug smuggling laws.
  • Countries often tried to get some legitimacy by putting together something ranging from a collection of allies to a sketchy coalition of the willing. Here, none of that was done.
  • Democratic countries breaking international law try to get some sort of cover within their own countries for what they were doing, but here the US Congress was told that it was all about the drugs, and the top members were only informed of what was being done while it was being done.

Now, one can argue that Maduro was a son of a bitch. He was. No need to argue. And I can totally understand that the 8 million Venezuelans who ran away from that country in the last 20 years have been celebrating since all of this happened, just for the pleasure of seeing that son of a bitch fucked. Now, since it has been a few days, if I were Venezuelan living in Miami or Madrid, I would maybe start considering a few things:

  • The US president has said that the US will run the country, but has not indicated any form of plan to do so, or any interest in really sending people to do it. When asked, the Secretary of State said that they would run Venezuela through the army. I thought that these were the same people running it before. For what it's worth, the US has run away from any notion of "regime change," and no regime change means that: no regime change.
  • Maduro stole the last election in Venezuela, but the US has not mentioned once the word "democracy," and the US president has explicitly said that the leader of the opposition, María Corina Machado, has no legitimacy and no support in the country. Read: she has no support from the US.
  • While not mentioning democracy at all, the US has mentioned left and right Venezuela's oil, referring to it for months as "our oil," and running to explain all the positives that US oil companies will get out of this.

Venezuelans, I am really happy that Maduro is out, and I am happy that you are celebrating that, but if I were you, I would wonder if the only reason why this happened is that the US just thought, “This guy is a s.o.b., but most importantly, he is not our s.o.b., so let’s put somebody else who works better with us, let’s do that in the easiest possible way, and this means let’s put another of these s.o.b.s, who then will just be our s.o.b..” At the end of the day, the US—and all sorts of other countries—are really happy to profitably work with plenty of s.o.b.’s whom they help to stay in power. I would also kind of note the revival of the Monroe Doctrine, remembering that the historical consequences of that doctrine have been things like Pinochet, Stroessner, Torrijos, la Escuela de las Américas, United Fruit, or the expression “banana republic.” If I were Venezuelan, I would hope that this time is different, I would probably open another bottle of champagne, but I would not yet start packing to move back to Caracas.

Summing up, this was the most arbitrary, unilateral, unjustified, and unnecessary breach of international law/norms since I was born. Sorry. Not quite. The worst done by a Western and, although it is starting to feel a bit weird to write that, democratic country. At the end of the day, what the US did in Venezuela is one-to-one what Putin would have wanted to do in Ukraine. Literally. First, there is the similarity between the pictures from Caracas and Hostomel, with the helicopters carrying special forces flying in. Also, the similarity of maintaining for months and for totally made-up reasons a military buildup around the country while saying, “Nothing here to see.” In fact, one should remember that Fiona Hill declared in 2019 in Congress that during the time she served in the US National Security Council as Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs, Russia floated the idea of making a deal with the US to swap Ukraine for Venezuela. The difference is that the US succeeded where Putin’s three-day military operation failed. Both Ukraine and Venezuela are pretty evidently identical imperial aggressions. What the US just did, and is doing by threatening with a second wave unless whoever is in power in Venezuela does as the US wishes, is the picture-book example of 19th-century gunboat diplomacy. In the 21st.

Now, I am divided. On the one side, I really wish that everything works out for Venezuela. Really. I have met my share of Venezuelans, all of them in one form or another refugees whose lives were screwed by Chávez and Maduro, all of them very decent, some of them I think of as friends, and I really wish that it all works out. I think of Rodrigo, and I wish that things work out, fast and easy. On the other hand, if I put on my hat as the guy who likes statistics, I hope that it is a fucking disaster. Why? Because all signs point out that this was just a first. Because the US will have gotten a high by how easy it was to pick up Maduro. Because Trump needs a high a week. And because, unless the thing in Venezuela becomes messy and unsuccessful, there will be enough times when getting a cheap win à la Venezuela will look like a very tempting method to distract from some inner political situation. The US just proved that they do not need any form of excuse to do it.

Now, there is something I have to say somewhere, but I don’t know where. So, here. If I were American, I would be pretty depressed by what is being done in my name. In fact, I would be really angry by what is being done to my country. And I am sure that this is how any lost American reading this feels. I send you a hug. But this is not about what happens within the US. It is about how the rest of the world reacts to what the US does, and from that point of view, there is no difference between the US and the US government.

Now, if I were Latin American, I would be really worried. But given that one day after the Caracas raid, the US president was telling once again that the US will get Greenland one way or another, I am also really worried as a European. Besides, in the National Security Strategy, there was all the talk about interfering in European politics.

So, Greenland. A few days ago, I said that I didn’t think that the World Cup would be canceled, but that I would not take bets. On the other hand, I would be happy to bet 100 euros, at equal odds, that the US actually takes Greenland during the next 3 years. If you want a date, I would say at some point from August to October 2026. Why? Well, a first idiotic thought: it is after the World Cup, and Trump will want his World Cup to be the goldenest in history. Then and mostly, because in the fall of 2026, there are the US midterm elections. Nobody could really do much to avoid a US “win” in Greenland, and this means that it all would probably be easy and smooth for the US. And, as a friend explained at some point, “Americans like winning.” The US just proved that they don’t need many reasons to do something, and influencing elections can look like a very good one. Besides, if, as it looks pretty likely if nothing weird happens, Democrats make pretty big wins in the midterms, Congress might remember its own existence, and Trump can find himself much more restrained, making crazy things like taking Greenland less likely. This might motivate the ideologues within the US government to move early. So, if you want to bet, write me an email, and I will be betting with whoever writes the first of the multitude of emails I will be getting.

The US taking Greenland would (will) have really huge implications. Not because of Greenland itself. At the end of the day, Greenland costs Denmark money, and there would be no drama if the Greenlanders voted to be fully independent. But the US taking it would have enormous implications. The shock in Europe would be huge. I see two reasons for that.

First, the breach of international law. Now, besides what the US just did, there are plenty of countries that breach international law all the time without there being consequences of any kind. The argument people often give when it comes to Israel and such is that international law only makes sense if the people in front respect it. It is disputable, but one cannot categorically say that they have no point. Now, the US taking Greenland would be an evident breach of international law against a country that takes international law seriously. In fact, against a group of countries, the EU, that is built on it. At the end of the day, the alternative to international law is the right of the strong, and the EU was explicitly built to stop European countries from thinking that might is right. If European countries were to take on the chin an evident breach of international law against one of their own, it would put into question the whole idea behind the European construct—if you want, in light of the National Security Strategy, this is even more motivation for the US to gamble on taking Greenland.

The second reason is that it is likely that some European countries would want to react forcefully while others would temper. This happens with respect to all sorts of things, but in a case like this, it could risk making the EU something of the past. What would the European treaties mean if, when it comes to something like this, what trumps are the interests of Bordeaux wineries or German can makers? I am pretty sure that some countries would close US bases, long-term damaging relations with the US. How would these countries feel towards other countries who just said a few nice words and didn’t do anything?

On the other hand, if Europe withstands a shock like the US taking Greenland, with a majority of EU countries—including all the major ones—taking decisive action on Denmark’s side, then the EU will be completely changed and strengthened. And it will be clear that we will be living in a new world. I am not sure that it is a better world because I would very much prefer to see Europe strengthened without an open breach with the US, but a new world nevertheless. If it does not, then also a new world.

Given that there is nothing that European countries could actually do to prevent the US from taking over Greenland, what could Europe do if this happens? For starters, US bases can be closed, diplomats can be sent home, individuals can be sanctioned, and Twitter can be forbidden to operate. All of this would be more performative than anything else, but sometimes being performative has a value of its own.

The downside is that evidently, Europe is dependent on the US for a number of things. Basically two. In some sense, militarily, with Russia at the door. I write “in some sense” because by now it is not clear at all to what extent Europe can depend on the US anyway. Besides, I am guessing that, seeing what has been going on in Ukraine, Russia would only be a threat if they think that Europe is going to roll over. Then, Europe is dependent on US tech. How so? Well, evidently because most European businesses and households use Apple, Microsoft, and Google products, and it would be really damaging if this stopped working from one day to the next, but it is not clear at all that this would happen. As I see it, what is more likely is a bunch of trouble, of things working in a more patchy way, at least for some time. I mean, it is not like the internet would not work at all, or that all data would be lost—at the end of the day, a fair proportion of European data is hosted in Europe itself, maybe in data centers run by US companies, but that is moot, as was the case that the largest gas storage in Germany was owned by Gazprom. Also, it is quite possible that for pure self-interest, US companies would push to keep operating in Europe.

But yes, Europe feels dependent on the US. And the US knows that. And if there is anything that makes the seizing of Greenland thinkable, it is that the US thinks that Europe would just go belly up and, after some amount of crying, dissolve. Basically the same idea that might lead Russia to do something.

And what could Europe do? Not give up an inch to Trump. After the 2024 stolen elections, no EU country recognized Maduro as the president of Venezuela: make clear that they are not going to recognize any government unless it is after fair elections. Enforce the Digital Services Act to the letter. If Europeans get banned from the US, reciprocate. If Europeans get banned from using Visa, speed up the deployment of the already existing European Payments Initiative. Apply the Anti-Coercion Mechanism. Remind the US that NVIDIA might design the best chips, but that all those chips are produced using machines from a European company, machines primarily made in Europe and for which there is no competition at this time. Threaten to ban the export of things like TNT—something like 90% of the TNT used in US weapons production comes from Poland.

Plan for the worst—and I guess hope for the best, I would be lucky to lose that Greenland bet. I am sure that the UK has plans for the case that undersea cables are cut, hoping that they will not. Just plan.

Then, push with military investment (it seems to me that it is being done) and with IT investment and resilience (it also seems like that, but I am sure that more can be done). Like Germany is doing, deploy soldiers permanently to the Baltic countries. Permanently because this means that soldiers don’t go there for 3 months and rotate, but move there for a couple of years with their families and such. That is a much bigger tripwire for Russia, even if there should evidently be evacuation plans.

Then, and most importantly, talk clearly to people. This is not easy because one has to talk to people who 5 years ago thought they didn’t have enemies, and now one has to explain them that both Russia and the US are behaving like enemies, and that means that a lot of things have to change, and that it will not be cheap and easy. Explain that the alternative is that one accepts being a colony of the US, with the US ultimately being able to impose the most convenient rules of the game for them in terms of taxes, tariffs, or even being forced to finance the US government—that is what the floated Mar-a-Lago accords are. Explain that another alternative, possibly compatible with the previous one, is that people go back to worrying because the Germans are rearming, and that the UK reminds everybody that they have been guaranteeing the independence of Belgium since 1830.

What do I expect? Well, a 50-50. COVID-level Eurobonds, just to deal with IT resilience, would probably make total sense, but I am not betting on it. But something will get done. A clear, unified position with respect to asking for respect for international law and such would make sense, but it is pretty clear that it will not happen. Still, there might be enough countries that keep the same clear position. Retirement age, benefits, increased salaries, social services, farmers, and such will continue dominating the whole discussion, but talk about the need for increased European sovereignty will play a greater role. That will make some of the hardball playing more palatable. We will have no Churchill, but if we get time, we might be fine. I hope we will. But unless something dramatically changes in the US, I still think that the question is not if the US takes Greenland, but when. Write to me if you want to bet. If you are American you can instead write to your representative, I guess.